Examination of the objections made in Britain against the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim / by J.G. Spurzheim.

  • Spurzheim, Johann Gaspard, 1776-1832.
Date:
1817
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Examination of the objections made in Britain against the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim / by J.G. Spurzheim. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    adopt several powers, I leave him to make the best use ot his one faculty, and proceed to other propositions. The Edinburgh Review, as to the faculties which we adopt in the human mind, says, p. 24-3. “ The ratiocina- tion of Drs Gall and Spurzheim is of the most difficult species to combat. Perhaps we might content ourselves with saying, that the whole doctrine of the thirty-three faculties to which the argument relates, is downright nonsense, and so put an end to the discussion at once;— but we shall take the liberty of substituting for the names of the thirty-three faculties, two very simple and intelli- gible terms, viz. intellect and inclination The reasoning, or rather dogmatic decision of a Re- viewer, certainly will not repel stubborn facts. I, how- ever, should like to know, why the conscientious Philo- sopher adopts intellect and inclination. May I suppose that he does so, because one or the other alone does not explain the phenomena of the mind ? Indeed, there may be strong inclination without intellect. But is inclination always the same ? Is, for instance, the inclination of the hen towards the young duck, hatched by her, the same with the inclination of the young duck towards the water ? Is the inclination to calumny or respect, to con- cealment or candour, one and the same ? In the same wray, is intellect only one ? In a boy who can repeat by heart whole pages after having read them once or twice, but cannot compare or distinguish two separate ideas, is the intellect the same as in another who judges with precision of various ideas, but cannot recollect by heart one page ? Thus, as we can have one inclination, or one intellect, and not another, philosophers have divided the powers of the mind into different sorts. Now we maintain, that those powers which are adopted by logicians as primitive or special faculties, do not explain