Volume 1

Cyclopaedia: or, an universal dictionary of arts and sciences ... The whole intended as a course of antient and modern learning, extracted from the best authors, dictionaries, journals, memoirs, transactions, ephemerides, &c. in several languages / By E. Chambers.

  • Chambers, Ephraim, approximately 1680-1740.
Date:
1741-1743
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Cyclopaedia: or, an universal dictionary of arts and sciences ... The whole intended as a course of antient and modern learning, extracted from the best authors, dictionaries, journals, memoirs, transactions, ephemerides, &c. in several languages / By E. Chambers. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    otv ,,rvcd m the figure of feme head, having in each four fhivers, three for the halliards, and one for the top-ropes to One of them ftands abaft the main-maft, and for that reafon is called the main-knight.—The other ftands abaft the fore- niaft, on the fecond deck, and is called the fore-knight, bee YoRE-Knight. , , i Knights-Fee, an ancient law term, fignifying fo much land of inheritance as is fufficient to maintain a knight with luit- able retinue; which, in Henry the Third’s days, was rec¬ koned at 15 /. per ann. By a flat. 1 Edward II. fuch as had 20/. per ann. in fee, or for life, might be compelled to be knights.—But this ftatute is repealed 17 Car. I. Srr 1 • Smith rates a knights-fee at 40/. yearly.—According to Coke, a knights-fee contained twelve carucates, or plow-lands.— Stow fays, that there were found in England, at the time of the conqueror, 60,211 knights-fees; according to others, there were 60,215 : whereof the religious houfes, before their fup- preflion, were poflefled of 28,015. See Fee. Knights Service, Servitium Militaire, a tenure whereby fe- veral lands in this nation were anciently held of the king ; which drew after it homage, fervice in war, efeuage, ward- fhip, marriage, lie. But taken away by the ftatute 12 Car. II. c. 24. See Service. KNIT Stockings. See the article Stockings. KNOCKING Mill. See the article Stamping. KNOT, properly denotes a part of a tree from whence it fhoots out branches, roots, or even fruit. See Tree, Branch, &c. The wood is harder and clofe in the knots than in any other part, but it is alfo more fubjedf to fplit. Vines and dwarf fruit-trees are pruned at the fecond knot of the new fhoot. The ufe of the knots of plants is to ftrengthen the ftem: They ferve alfo as fearces to filtrate, purify, and refine the juice raifed up for the nourifhment of the plant. Knots of the log-line, at fea, are the divifions of it. See Log. Thefe are ufually feven fathoms or forty-two feet afunder, but they fhould be fifty feet; and then, as many knots as the log-line runs out in half a minute, fo many miles doth the Ihip fail in an hour, fuppofing her to keep going at an equal rate, and allowing for yaws, lee-way, Cf<s\ Knot, in medicine, a protuberance in the joints of old gouty people; confifting of a thick, vifeous, crude, indigefted pi- tuita, accompanied with a bilious humour, hot and acrimoni¬ ous ; the groffeft and moft terreftrial part whereof clogs and converts into a ftony fubftance like chalk. See Gout. Knots appear to be generated like ftones in the bladder. See Calculus. Phyficians fometimes alfo call them nodes, and tophi. See Tophus, and Node. Knot is alfo ufed for the intrigue of a romance, or dramatic piece; being that part where the perfons are the moft emba- rafted, by a conjun&ure of affairs whole end it is not eafy to forefee. See Intrigue. Ariftotle, under this term includes all the incidents of a trage¬ dy, from its beginning to the place where it begins to unravel. The knot holds as long as the mind is kept fufpended about the event. The knot ought always to laft to the middle of the fifth a&, otherwife the reft of the piece languilhes. Order of the Knot, is the name of a military order in the king¬ dom of Naples, inftituted in 1352, by queen Jane I. on oc- cafion of the peace eftablilhed between her and the king of Hungary, by means of her marriage with Louis, Prince of Tarentum. The order confifted of fixty knights: Clement VI. approved this order, and gave it the rule of S. Bafil: It chofe S. Ni¬ cholas for its protestor, but dwindled away after the death of its foundrels. KNOWING, Principles, and Rules of See Principle, and Rule. KNOWLEDGE, according to Mr. Locke, confifts in the per ception of the connexion and agreement, or difagreement and repugnancy, of our ideas. See Idea. In which fenfe, knowledge ftands oppofed to ignorance. See Ignorance. To know that white is not black, is only to perceive that thefe two ideas do not agree. So, in knowing that the three an¬ gles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; what do we more than perceive, that equality to two right ones necefla- rily agrees to, and is infeparable from, the three angles of a triangle ? Kinds of Knowledge.—For what relates to the agreement or difagreement of ideas, we may reduce the whole doctrine, and confequently the whole ftock of our knowledge, to four heads; viz. identity or diverfity, relation, co-exijlence, and real exi/lence. As to the identity, or diverfity of our ideas, we may obferve, that it is the firft a£t of the mind to perceive its own ideas; and fo far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby to perceive their difference; that is, the one not to t K N O be the other: by this the mind clearly perceives each idea to a«ree with itfelf, and to be what it is; and all diftind ideas to difao-ree.—This it does without any pains, or dedu&ion, by its natural power of perception, and diftin&ion ; and for doing this, men of art have eftablilhed certain general rules, or principles; as, that what is, is; and that it is impoftible for the fame thing to be, and not to be.—But no maxim can make a man know clearer, that round is not fquare, than the bare perception of thefe two ideas, which the mind, at firft fight, perceives to difagree. See Axiom. The next kind of agreement, or difagreement, the mind per¬ ceives, in any of its ideas, may be called relative, and is no- thino- but the perception of the relation between any two i- deas^ of what kind foever; that is, their agreement, or dif¬ agreement, one with another, in the feveral ways, or refpe&s, the mind takes of comparing them. See Relation. The third fort of agreement, or difagreement, to be found in our ideas, is co-exiftence, or non co-exiftence, in the fame fubjeft; and this belongs particularly to fubftances.—-Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this; that fixednefs, or a power to remain in the fire unconfirmed, is an idea which always accompanies that particular fort of yellownefs, weight, fufibility, &c. which makes our complex idea fignified by the word gold. The fourth fort, is that of adlual and real exiftence, agree¬ ing to any idea. See Existence. Within thefe four forts of agreement, or difagreement, feems contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of; for all that we know, or can affirm concerning any idea, is, that it is, or is not the fame with fome other; as, that blue is not yellow : that it does or does not co-exift with another in the fame fubjeit; as, that iron is fufceptible of magnetical im- preffions: that it hath that or this relation to fome other i- deas j as, that two triangles, upon equal bales, between the fame parallels, are equal: or, that it has a real exiftence with¬ out the mind ; as, that God is. The mind becomes poflefted of truth, in feveral manners, which conftitute fo many different /pecies of knowledge.—Thus, when the mind has a prefent view of the agreement, or dif¬ agreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one with another, it is called aftual knowledge. Secondly, a man is faid to know any propofition, when having once evidently perceived the agreement, or difagreement, of the ideas whereof it confifts, and fo lodged it in his memory, that whenever it comes to be reflected on again, the mind af- fents to it without doubt, or hefitation, and is certain of the truth of it: this may be called habitual knowledge.——.And thus a man may be faid to know all thofe truths which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing, clear, and full percep¬ tion. Of habitual knowledge, there are two forts; the one con¬ fifts of fuch truths, laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation that is be¬ tween their ideas ; and this is in all thofe truths where the ideas themfelves, by an immediate view, difeover their agree¬ ment, or difagreement, one with another.—The other is of fuch truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it re-g, tains the memory of the conviction, without the proofs.— Thus a man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the demonftration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, knows it to be true, when that demon¬ ftration is gone out of his mind, and cannot poffibly be re¬ collected : but he knows it in a different way from what he did before ; namely, not by the intervention of thofe interme¬ diate ideas; whereby the agreement, or difagreement, of thofe in the propofition, was at firft perceived ; but by remembring, that is, knowing, that he was once certain of the truth of this propofition, That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones.—The immutability of the fame relations between the fame immutable things, is now the idea, that fhews him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be fo.—And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true, is always true ; what ideas once agreed, will always agree ; and confequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always*. biow to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Degrees of Knowledge.—As to the different degrees, or clearnefs of our knowledge, it feems to lie in the different way which the mind has of perceiving the agreement, or dif¬ agreement, of any of its ideas.—When the mind perceives this agreement, or difagreement, of two ideas immediately by themfelves, without the intervention of any other, we may call it intuitive knowledge; in which cafe the mind perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being dire&ed to¬ wards it.—Thus the mind perceives, that white is not black j that three are more than two, and equal to one and two.—This part of knoivledge is irrefiftible ; and, like the bright fun-lhine, forces itfelf immediately to be perceived, as foon as ever the mind turns its view that way.—It is on this intuition that depends all the certainty, and evidence of i our • fe- : >*