A new logic / by Charles Mercier.

  • Mercier, Charles Arthur, 1852-1919.
Date:
1912
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: A new logic / by Charles Mercier. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    435/458 (page 403)
    CHAPTER XXVI FAULTS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEMS OF LOGIC From time to time in the course of this book, I have called attention to errors and defects that seem to me to exist in the scheme of Traditional Logic, in the scheme of Induction, and in Modern Logic. Lest, however, there should be any misunder- standing as to the nature or the extent of my disagreement with them, it seems advisable to summarise here the more important of the topics to which this disagreement extends. The promul- gator of what purports to be new, is under obligation to make clear in what the novelty consists; and, irrespective of this obligation, it is germane to my purpose, of superseding Tradi- tional Logic and Inductive Logic by a Logic that pretends to be more complete and more accurate, and Modern Logic by one that pretends to be more intelligible if less profound, to collect together what seem to me to be the main errors and defects of my predecessors, and expose them in all their naked deformity. When I am told, as no doubt I shall be told, that my system of Logic is wrong from top to bottom, and from beginning to end, I must bear the accusation with what equanimity I can summon; but I wish to forestall, if I can, the charge that my differences from pre-existing systems of Logic have been anticipated ; that they are of trifling importance ; or that they are mere verbal modifications. In the first place, I regard it as a defect in existing systems of Logic, that its nature, purpose, and scope are left by them in doubt. No two logicians agree as to what Logic is, what it purports to treat of, or how far its range extends. They do not agree as to whether it is a Science or an Art. Those who regard it as a Science do not agree as to the nature of its subject-matter ; those who regard it as an Art are not agreed as to what it does. No logician up to the present time, except Spencer, who, to use an Hibernicism, was not a logician, has recognised that logical processes are not two, but three, or has admitted Analogy, properly so called, to a place among reasoning processes. The D D 2